When group decisions involve the allocation of resources to group members, the members might have an incentive to strategically distort any information they provide to increase their share of resources. The paper compares several simple multi-criteria group decision methods with respect to this problem. We show, using a computational model, that strategic manipulation of preference information is possible in all of the methods, although to a different extent. Furthermore, when the true solution generated by this methods is not Pareto-optimal, manipulation attempts might even improve the efficiency of outcomes.
Introduction
Organizations often use committees to make important decisions, which are of strategic importance or involve the allocation of considerable resources, like the selection of research and development projects or investments in new production facilities. These decision problems can be characterized by several features, which together make their solution particularly difficult. Firstly, they involve many different and conflicting criteria. Strategic investments can not be evaluated using only short-term financial criteria like net present value. When such projects are compared, also longrun strategic aspects must be taken into account, which cannot easily be quantified or directly be expressed in monetary terms. Often, data on many of those criteria, as well as trade-offs between them, cannot be assessed objectively, but requires the expertise and subjective judgement of specialists in various areas. This subjectivity and distribution of relevant knowledge between different persons (and different parts of the organization) is one important reason why such decisions are delegated to committees.
Consequently, problems of group decision making using multiple criteria have attracted considerable interest both in theoretical and applied research and several methods have been developed to support groups when solving this kind of problem (Jelassi et al., 1990; Vetschera, 1990; Limayem & DeSanctis, 2001; Matsatsinis & Samaras, 2001; Teng & Ramamurthy, 1993) . Since the assessment of alternatives in different criteria and the formulation of preferences between criteria are already demanding tasks for the individual group members, many of those methods try to reduce the cognitive strain to members by interactively asking only for a limited amount of preference information. Thus, the problems associated with a complete specification of preferences, for example in the form of a multi-attribute utility function, are avoided.
But the subjectivity and high specialization of information to be provided by group members in solving multi-criteria group decision problems leads to a second type of problem. Information provided by one group member can hardly be verified by other members, because they usually lack the particular expertise in that field. But when the decision to be made involves the allocation of considerable resources, it might directly affect individual interests of the group members. Thus, there might exist a considerable incentive to manipulate the group decision procedure by providing distorted preference information. Given the inherently subjective nature of preferences and the high specificity of information, such distortions can hardly be detected by others. For example, consider a decision about the development and introduction of a new product, which could be based on different technologies. Different research teams in a firm, who develop these technologies, could try to bias the decision in favor of their technologies by overstating their potential or downplaying risks. Such distortions would be hard to detect by others, who are less familiar with a particular technology. Taking this concept one step further, trade-off decisions between different criteria in selecting sub-projects are even harder to be controlled. Thus, one team could favor sub-projects that contribute less to the final product, but are important to the team for other reasons.
The present paper analyzes the potential for such manipulations of multi-criteria group decision methods. Its focus is on the manipulation by distorting preference information. Thus, in comparison with traditional models of agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jennergren, 1980; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; van Ackere, 1993) , the asymmetry of information considered in this paper is rather limited. Only preference information, which is inherently subjective, is considered to be private information. All other information, for which objective verification can be imagined, is considered to be public.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section two, we provide a formal description of the decision problem to be solved by the group and survey related approaches. Section three describes the group decision methods analyzed in this study. Section four develops a model of manipulating preference information in these methods, which is analyzed by computational techniques in section five. Section six concludes the paper by summarizing is results and giving an outlook onto future research.
Problem Description and Related Literature

The decision problem
We consider a group of M members indexed by m = 1, . . . , M , which has to solve a joint problem of allocating resources to different activities. We will refer to these activities as projects, but one could also imagine that activities are related to manufacturing certain products or providing different types of services. Projects (activities) are proposed and carried out by the group members, who for example represent different departments within an organization. We will use the terms group members and departments interchangably in the remainder of this paper. The relationship between resources and activities is modeled in a standard linear programming framework. Each group member can propose different projects to be undertaken. The set of projects proposed by member m is denoted by I M , the set of all projects from all members by I. All projects can be undertaken at most once and are fully divisible. In the following models, variables 0 ≤ x i ≤ 1 will be used to indicate the extent to which project i is carried out. If projects are indivisible, x i must be defined as a binary variable. However, for the purpose of this study, considering indivisible projects would not change the basic structure of the problem, but would at the same time considerably increase the computational complexity of the models used.
Each project requires two categories of resources:
• local resources, which are available at each department and are consumed only by projects proposed and carried out by that department;
• global resources, which are originally available at the level of the entire organization and must be allocated to departments to carry out projects.
Local resources could be related for example to special know how or equipment that is used only for projects of a specific department. Global resources correspond to financial means or other, more general, resources, which can be used in all departments. From a modeling point of view, the distinction between local and global resources also has important consequences: since the supply of local resources is always limited and cannot be changed, local resources provide a strict upper bound on the projects a department can undertake. Thus at some point, allocating additional global resources to a department will no longer improve the results for that department. There are several types of both local and global resources.
Project i, if carried out in full, requires a ji units of local resource j. The set of local resources (across all departments) is denoted by J, the set of local resources of department m by J m . The total amount of resource j available is b j . This leads to local resource constraints of the form
There is a set P of global resources, the total amount of global resource p available to the organization is denoted by R p . Thus the following global constraints must be satisfied:
The group members pursue different and multiple objectives, which are also assumed to be linear functions of the projects undertaken. Thus the level of objective k achieved is given by
The set of all objectives is denoted by K, the set of objectives pursued by member m by K m . The sets K m are not necessarily disjoint.
Formally, the preferences of group member m with respect to the goals are represented by a utility function
This utility function is considered private information of the group member. Even the group members themselves need not know their utility functions (4) explicitly. But we assume that given a certain allocation of global resources, they are able to determine the set of projects that would maximize their utility employing these resources by using, for example, an interactive multi-objective programming method like the methods proposed in (Korhonen & Wallenius, 1988; Shin & Ravindran, 1991; Gardiner & Steuer, 1994) .
The group has to determine which projects should be carried out given the limited availability of global resources. This decision can be made in two ways: either the portfolio of projects to be realized is chosen directly at the group level, or the group only determines an allocation of global resources to members, who then decide by themselves which project are implemented with these resources. At the group level, the utility functions of group members with respect to the criteria are not known. The only information about a member's preferences available is the portfolio of projects which a group member would chose when given a certain amount of the global resources. However, all objective information about the projects, i.e. their resource requirements a ji and d pi as well as their contributions to the objectives c ki are known to all group members. The endowment of each group member with local resources (b j ) as well as the amount of global resources available (R p ) are also publicly known. Thus, when a group member announces the set of projects which would be carried out with a given allocation of global resources, it is possible for all other group members to determine whether all of the allocated global resources would actually be consumed and what levels of the objective functions that member would achieve.
Related literature
Several streams of literature have dealt with similar problems as the problem outlined above. The most obvious one is the literature on multi-objective group decision making (Seo, 1985; Hwang & Lin, 1987; Bui, 1990; Vetschera, 1990; Iz & Krajewski, 1992) , which combines two important branches of decision theory: multi-criteria decision making and group decision making. The group decision methods analyzed in this study, which will be described in the next section, have their roots in this type of literature. However, the present problem differs in two important aspects from the usual problems and assumptions considered in this field:
Group decision making methods under multiple criteria usually assume that the set of alternatives available to the group (or its members) is given and fixed. But when the group decision involves the allocation of resources to group members, the feasible set of alternatives for the member changes. This change might influence the validity of preference information provided for one possible allocation of resources when one tries to utilize the same information for another resource allocation. This problem was discussed in (Stummer & Vetschera, 2003) , who proposed an interactive approach to overcome it. But since the simulation experiments performed in (Stummer & Vetschera, 2003) indicated that the interactive approach improved solution quality only slightly, we will not elaborate on this topic for the purpose of the present paper.
Another assumption of most multi-criteria group decision methods, on which we focus in the present paper, is that group members truthfully provide any information required by the method and do not try to manipulate the method by providing distorted information. This assumption is usually motivated by pointing out that the relationship between information provided by the member and the outcome of the method is very complex. Thus, group members would not be able to successfully manipulate the procedures (Stummer, 2001 ).
This deliberate manipulation of preference information is at the focus of another stream of literature, which refers to it as a "game of misrepresentation" or "distortion game" (Sobel, 2001; Kìbrìs, 2002) .This type of analysis is based on models from game theory, and therefore uses the assumptions which are common in that field. Group decision methods studied are usually based on axiomatic solutions from cooperative game theory, like the Nash bargaining solution or the Kalai-Smorodinski solution. These concepts require information on the utility functions of group members. In distortion games, one assumes that players have to specify their utility function to an arbitrator, but can in fact announce any function that fulfills some formal requirements (like monotonicity or concavity). Thus, while the underlying research question of this literature is very similar to that of the present paper, the information requirements are much more restrictive.
The decision model which is studied here is rather similar to models used in the area of "linear production games" (Owen, 1975; Kalai & Zemel, 1982; Curiel et al., 1989; Fernandez et al., 2003) . These games are based on a standard linear production model. Players to the game each hold an initial endowment of resources and the problem is to distribute the profit obtained from employing those resources among the players who have contributed their endowments. Owen (1975) already showed that the resulting cooperative game is balanced and thus has a nonempty core. Therefore, it is possible to find an allocation of profit in which the grand coalition, in which all players pool their resources and use the most efficient production technology available to any player, is a stable outcome.
While these models do not explicitly distinguish between local and global resources, and consider a situation in which all players may hold a certain part of all types of resources, these differences to our model are not substantial. The structure of equations (1), (2) and (3) can be generated in a production game setting by a suitable choice of coefficients. A more significant difference results from the objective functions used. Linear production games are cooperative games with transferable utility. There is only one common objective function, which describes the profit of a given production program. Utility of group members is identical to the profit allocated to them, thus a direct transfer of utility is possible. In contrast, in our model, group members can have different objectives, and even if some objectives are the same for some members, they can have different trade-offs between objectives. Thus, transferring one unit of one type of outcome from one member to another will not necessarily be a zero sum situation, and by exchanging different types of outcomes between members, Pareto-improvements can be obtained.
Group Decision Methods
Ideal point
In this section, we review some approaches to multi-criteria group decision making that can be applied to the given decision problem. As was already stated, the only information that is provided by group members about their preferences is a set of projects which they would undertake when a certain amount of the global resources is allocated to the department. However, the allocation of resources must be determined during the procedure. As a starting point to obtain information about the group member's preferences, some arbitrary allocation must therefore be used. One possibility is to use the ideal point, which we define as the optimal goal vector which that group member could obtain if she were able to use all global resources.
All decision methods which we consider in this paper therefore consist of two phases: in the first phase, members determine their ideal points and provide information on the ideal point and the projects they would carry out to the group. In the second phase, this information is used at the group level to find a compromise solution.
Formally, the ideal point corresponds to the solution of the following optimization problem:
The objective levels obtained in a member's ideal point will be denoted by (y * m1 , . . . , y * m|K| ) and the actual amount of global resources needed by (s * m1 , . . . , s * m|P | ). When the member's utility function is monotonic with respect to all objectives, the ideal point is an efficient solution in objective space. Which of the infinitely many efficient solution is chosen depends on the group member's preferences towards the objectives. Thus the objective levels achieved in the ideal point implicitly contain information about the importance of objectives to that member.
This ideal point can be used in several ways to generate a fair compromise between group members. In this paper, we only briefly review the group decision models analyzed. For a more comprehensive review of related models and the methodological background of the methods presented here, see (Stummer & Vetschera, 2003) .
Goal programming
The basic idea of this model is to use the distance to the ideal point as an approximation of the member's utility function. Since objectives can be differently scaled, they are normalized by the value of the ideal point. The distance in objective k is thus given by
∆ mk is scaled between zero and one, where zero indicates full satisfaction with that particular objective and one complete dissatisfaction. To provide an approximation of the member's utility function, which increases for higher preference, these values have to be transformed. To aggregate across criteria, we use the 1 -norm and thus obtain the following measure of closeness to the ideal point of member m:
In order to find a compromise solution at the group level, the (approximate) utilities of all members represented by the ∆ m 's have to be aggregated. Using the Nash bargaining solution as a framework for this aggregation, the product operator can be used. We thus obtain the following model to find a compromise solution at the group level:
Many variants of this approach have been proposed in the literature (Yu, 1973; Leung, 1982; Hwang & Lin, 1987; Bronisz et al., 1988; Iz & Krajewski, 1992) . They differ in the type of distance measure used to evaluate deviations from the ideal point as well as aggregation techniques across group members. The formulation used in (8) is rather straightforward, nevertheless it is widely accepted in the literature.
Proportional goal achievement
In the goal programming model (8), information on the group member's preferences is implicitly taken from their ideal points via the distance to this point. The relationship of preference statements to the final solution obtained from the goal programming model thus might not be transparent to group members.
Another approach is to explicitly consider some properties of the ideal point in the compromise solution.
One property of the ideal point, which is closely related to the group member's preferences, is the ratio of objective values. When one objective has a particularly high value compared to the other objectives, it can be concluded that the group member has a strong interest in this objective and probably would also like to have a high value in this objective in the compromise solution. This method therefore attempts to find a compromise solution in which the ratio of objectives for each group member is as close as possible to the ratio in the ideal point, while at the same time satisfying the global resource constraints.
The ratio of objectives can be preserved by minimizing, for each group member, the Tchebycheff ( 1 ) distance to the ideal point. This distance can be represented by
When, for consistency, the minimum operator is also used to aggregate across group members, we obtain the following model to generate a compromise solution at the group level:
Proportional resource allocation
In both the goal programming (8) and the proportional goal achievement (10) models, the final decision which projects are implemented is made at the group level when the compromise solution is determined. But this decision can also be left to the individual members, only the allocation of resources needs to be decided at the group level. One straightforward and frequently used mechanism for such allocations is a proportional split, where the share of the resource a group member receives is proportional to that group member's resource usage in the ideal point. Thus each group member receives
The optimal use of these resources can then be determined by each group member using a similar model to (5):
Possibilities for Manipulation
All three compromise models use a member's ideal point to infer the preferences of that member and compute a compromise solution or resource allocation. However, the ideal point depends on that member's utility function, which is private information. Thus, it cannot be verified whether the group members truthfully report their ideal points or not.
In order to exploit this asymmetry of information, a group member needs to anticipate how a distortion in the ideal point which she reports will affect the compromise solution and thus her utility. Formally, this situation corresponds to a hierarchical decision problem as introduced by Schneeweiss (1999) . For simplicity, we assume that the group member perfectly anticipates the outcome in phase 2. This implies that the group member already knows the ideal points of the other group members. For the purpose of this paper, we also assume that the other group members truthfully report their ideal points. While both the assumptions on perfect anticipation and truthful reporting are not realistic from a more general point of view, even this simplified setting can provide the answer to some interesting questions: If, given that other members report their ideal points truthfully, it is not possible for one member to improve her position by distorting information on the ideal point, then truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium. If, however, a member can improve her situation by deviating from the true ideal point, then truthful reporting is not an equilibrium.
The structure of a model to evaluate possible deviations can best be explained for the proportional resource allocation model (11) and (12). We denote the selection of projects in phase one (when determining the reported "ideal point") by x 0 i and the projects in the second phase, after the resources are allocated, by x 1 i . Correspondingly, the resource usage reported in the first phase is denoted by s 0 mp . For a given resource usage in phase 1, the resource allocation in phase 2 is given by
Using model (12), the utility value that can be achieved for a given s 0 mp can be determined. Thus it is possible to determine the s 0 mp which maximize utility in the second phase.
However, s 0 mp cannot be chosen freely, but has to correspond to undertaking some set of projects, which also needs to fulfill the local and global resource constraints. By combining the constraints of phase 1 with model (12), we obtain the following model:
Model (14) does not explicitly contain the ideal point reported after phase 1. However, this point can easily be computed as y
Intuitively, one could assume that this "ideal point" is efficient with respect to the goals of member m. If any of the member's objectives could be improved without worsening another objective, the dominating solution would most likely also need more resources than the dominated one. Increasing resource usage in phase 1 would lead to a higher resource allocation in phase 2 and thus make the member better off in the final outcome.
However, this argument implicitly assumes that resources are used efficiently in phase 1. But there is nothing in model (14) that would lead to efficient resource usage in phase 1. To the contrary, the group member could increase resource utilization in phase 1 and thus improve her situation in phase 2 by selecting very inefficient projects in phase 1. Since projects selected in phase 1 also have to fulfill the local resource constraints, it is in fact optimal to select those projects which need many global resources in relation to their usage of local resources, independently of their contribution to the objectives. Thus it is well possible that an "ideal point" created in this way is inefficient with respect to the group member's objectives, and numerical examples indicate that such solutions do exist.
However, if the member's utility function is monotonic in all goals, the true ideal point must be efficient with respect to the objectives. Domination of the reported ideal point is a condition which, under our information assumptions, can be checked by other group members, since they also know all coefficients of the constraints and objective functions of model (5). Thus, any manipulation attempt using a model like (14), in which a dominated "ideal point" is reported, can be uncovered.
Therefore the group member must specify an "ideal point" in the first phase which is not dominated with respect to that member's goals. The member thus has to maximize a nonlinear function over the efficient set of a linear multiobjective optimization problem. Furthermore, the function which is to be optimized is by itself only implicitly given and involves the solution of a possibly nonlinear optimization problem like the compromise models (8) and (10) or the final resource allocation model (12). Thus, established methods to optimize a function over the efficient set (Horst & Thoai, 1999; Thoai, 2000; Tuyen & Muu, 2001) , which rely on an explicitly given objective function with specific properties like convexity, cannot be applied to our problem.
For the numerical experiments reported in the next section, a specific method was developed to solve this kind of problem. This method combines a projection-based approach to scanning the efficient set of a multiobjective problem (Wierzbicki, 1986; Korhonen & Wallenius, 1988 ) with a direct search algorithm (Hooke & Jeeves, 1961; ACM, 1968) for the optimization of general nonlinear functions in several variables. The main advantage of the direct search algorithm is that it does not need the derivative of the function being optimized and thus it can be used even if the function is only implicitly described by some algorithm, as is the case in our problem.
The direct search algorithm starts from an initial solution. In an inner loop, this solution is modified by increasing or decreasing each component of the solution vector by a constant step size. If a change in a component improves the objective function value, it is retained, otherwise the original value of that component is restored. In an outer loop, the step size is decreased to narrow the search range. To simplify calculations and reduce the number of optimization problems that need to be solved in the computational experiments, this adjustment of the step size was not performed in the experiments and the algorithm terminated after a fixed number of iterations or when no improvement of the objective function could be obtained using a constant step size.
The direct search algorithm can only be used to solve unconstrained optimization problems. To search the efficient frontier of the multiobjective optimization problem underlying (5), each search vector z generated by the direct search algorithm was projected onto the efficient frontier using the Tchebycheff ( ∞ ) distance by solving the following linear programming problem:
The pseudo code for the entire search algorithm is shown in figure 1 .
set initial search vector z to the correct ideal point computed from (5) repeat for all dimensions k of vector z do increase z k by constant step size compute ideal point y from z using model (16) compute resource allocation and payoff from reporting ideal point y if payoff greater than current maximum then keep change else undo change decrease z k by constant step size compute ideal point y from z using model (16) compute resource allocation and payoff from reporting ideal point y if payoff greater than current maximum then keep change else undo change end end end until maximum number of iterations or no more improvement 
Computational Experiments
The algorithm presented in figure 1 enables us to analyze computationally whether group members can profit from distorting their preference information. Although it would be preferable to have an analytical solution or at least a numerical method which generates an optimal solution to the problem, this rather straightforward computational approach can still be used to generate interesting results. If it is possible for a group member to improve her position in this model, then truthful reporting is shown not to be an equilibrium strategy. Since the same search algorithm is used in conjunction with all group decision methods, it can also be used to compare the methods.
Hypotheses and measurement
Our analysis will focus on three issues: I The possibility to improve one's position by strategic distortion of the ideal point.
II
The consequences of such distortions on other group members.
III Differences between the group decision methods studied.
Specifically, we can formulate the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 1: It is possible for group members to improve their situation by unilaterally deviating from truthfully reporting the ideal point. (14) can be used to find numerical examples in which a group member can improve her position by distorting the reported ideal point. However, this model can generate solutions which are dominated in objective space and the question remains open if an improvement is still possible when reported ideal points are constrained to be efficient in objective space. When moving from one efficient point in objective space to another, the group member has to give up on at least one of the objectives in order to improve on other objectives. Since the true ideal point is optimal with respect to the member's preferences, she would not be willing to make this trade-off. As all group decision methods studied try to approximate the members' preferences, it can be assumed that when one objective is worsened in the reported ideal point, the compromise solution offered by the group decision method will also lead to a lower outcome in that objective. Only if that trade-off in the compromise solution is perceived differently than in the ideal point, the member will be willing to accept a change in the compromise solution.
Hypothesis 2: The possibility to improve one's situation by distorting the reported ideal point will be different for the different compromise models.
Since the methods introduced in section 3 are rather different, we also expect that the effects of manipulation attempts will be different.
Hypothesis 3: If a group member improves her position in the compromise solution by distorting the ideal point, the resulting compromise will be worse for the other group members.
Hypothesis 3 would be trivial if the methods always generated Pareto optimal solutions. However, since the methods only approximate the true utility functions of group members, the solutions obtained are not necessarily Pareto optimal with respect to the true utility functions. Therefore, it is theoretically possible that changes in the compromise solution lead to gains for all group members.
Hypothesis 4: Effects of strategic distortions on other group members will be different for different methods.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 deal with the efficiency of outcomes. It might be easier to achieve a Pareto improvement when the initial solution is very far from the efficient frontier than when a solution is "almost efficient". To further analyze these hypotheses, a cardinal measure for efficiency, rather than the ordinal statement that a solution is efficient or not, is needed. A cardinal measure of efficiency for input-output relations was developed by Farrell (1957) . This measure can be adapted to measure the degree of efficiency for group decisions. The basic idea of this approach is illustrated in figure 2.
Point P in figure 2 is inefficient, both group members can improve their position without worsening the situation of the other member. Any point on the efficient frontier between E 1 and E 2 dominates point P and could be used as a reference point in evaluating the efficiency of P . Following the approach of Farrell (1957) , we use point P , which lies on a straight line from the origin through point P . Thus the ratio of utility values of group members is the same in point P and point P . Efficiency of point P is then defined as
Clearly, 0 ≤ E ≤ 1 and E = 1 indicates an efficient point.
For our problem, E can be determined for a given utility vector (u * m ) by solving the nonlinear optimization problem
Let z * be the optimal objective value of problem (18). Then E = 1/z * .
Experimental setup
The models presented in section 3 and the search algorithm shown in figure 1 were implemented using the GAMS modeling language (Brooke et al., 1988) . The CONPT2 solver was used to solve the nonlinear optimization problems. All problems were formulated for M = 2 group members, where member 1 reported a distorted ideal point while member 2 was reporting truthfully. The true utility functions of members were assumed to have the form
To study the sensitivity of results to parameter changes, the parameters were varied individually starting from a base scenario using the values shown in table 1. In the utility function (19), equal weights of 0.5 were used for all objectives. The parameter ρ was set to 2. Additional experiments with ρ = 5 showed that this parameter does not have a significant effect on results. 300 experiments with randomly generated coefficients a ji , d pi and c ki were performed for the base scenario. In the sensitivity analysis, 100 experiments were performed for each parameter setting.
Results
Each experiment can lead to one of three possible outcomes:
• No manipulation is possible
• Member 1 can improve her situation while at the same time the result for member 2 is worse than in the original solution (one-sided improvement)
• There is a Pareto-improvement in which both members are better off. Table 2 shows the distribution of these three cases in the base scenario for the three methods studied. As the table clearly indicates, hypothesis 1 can be accepted. For all methods, there is a considerable number of instances in which a deviation from truthful reporting improves the situation for member 1. The table also provides sufficient evidence to reject hypothesis 3: for all methods, there are instances in which a successful manipulation by one member leads to a compromise which is not worse for the other member, but provides a Pareto improvement for both. Concerning hypotheses 2 and 4, table 2 also shows that the methods do indeed lead to rather different results. While the Goal Programming model provided only few opportunities for a Pareto improvement, such improvements were more frequent with the other two models. The significant differences between the methods can be verified by a χ 2 -test, which shows a significant impact of the method used on the distribution of the cases (χ 2 = 111.69, p < 0.0001).
There are two possible explanations for the differences in the number of Pareto-improvements of the Goal Programming model compared to the other two models: this effect could be a direct consequence of differences in the methods, which would indicate that Goal Programming reacts differently to manipulation attempts than the other two methods. Furthermore, one has to take into account that a Pareto improvement is only possible if the solution obtained with correct preference information is not efficient with respect to the utilities of the two players. If Goal Programming creates a significantly higher number of efficient solution for true preference information, this could also explain the low number of Pareto improvements.
This question can be answered by considering only those experiments in which the solution with true preference information is not efficient and thus a Pareto improvement is possible. Tables 4 to 6 show the impact of parameter changes on the results. The data indicates that problem dimensions in general have only a weak influence on outcomes. The only noticeable influence results from changes in the number of projects. When there are only few projects, it is more difficult to manipulate the outcomes than when there are many projects available. Thus the percentage of cases in which no manipulation was possible at all decreases with the number of projects. At the same time, the number of initially inefficient solutions also increases for all three methods as can be observed in figure 3 . This would make a higher number of Pareto-improvements possible. However, a substantial increase in the number of Pareto improvements can be observed only for the Proportional Goal model, while for the Goal Programming model, the main increase takes place for the unilateral improvements.
To test these relationships statistically, logistic regression models were estimated for the possibility of manipulation (one-sided and Pareto improvements combined) and the two cases of one-sided and Pareto improvements. Since a Pareto improvement is only possible when the initial solution is inefficient, all three models were estimated for the 2849 data points in which the initial solution was inefficient. Table 7 : Logistic regression: possibility of manipulation presented in tables 7 to 9.
As table 7 shows, there is a significant difference in manipulation possibilities between the Proportional Goal model, where manipulations can be performed more often, and the Proportional Resource model, which was the reference category for this regression. On the other hand, the difference between the Goal Programming model and the Proportional Resource model is not significant. The number of local resources has no significant effect, while increasing the number of projects and the number of global resources significantly increases the possibility for manipulation. Even a one-sided improvement can increase efficiency as measured by E, but also could lower it. Table  10 shows the distribution of changes in E for the three models and both inefficient and efficient initial solutions. Of course, when the initial solution is already efficient, no further increase in efficiency is possible.
The table shows that the effect of one-sided improvements depends on the method used. For the Goal Programming model, one-sided improvements are slightly more likely to increase efficiency, for the Proportional Goal model, increases and decreases are about equally likely, while for the proportional resources model, a one-sided improvement is more likely to decrease efficiency. In some rare instances, an efficient initial solution became inefficient after manipulation for all three models. The difference between methods is confirmed by a χ 2 -test for both the initially inefficient cases (N = 908, χ 2 = 41.04, p < 0.0001) and the entire data set (N = 1147, χ 2 = 246.99, p < 0.0001).
Conclusions and Future Research
Our results show that methods for multi-criteria group decision making, which are commonly proposed in the literature, can indeed be manipulated by specifying incorrect preference information. This result has important consequences both for the field of group decision making and for economic models of asymmetric information.
For the field of group decision making, it is obvious that the potential for strategic manipulation cannot be ignored. The usual argument found in the literature is that although the methods could in theory be manipulated by strategically deviating from correct preference information, such a manipulation would be too complex to be performed in practice because of the complexity of the models involved (Stummer, 2001 ). This view must be questioned in view of our results. On one hand, the models used here were indeed rather complex and involved a perfect anticipation of the manipulation results. But on the other hand, there is nothing in the manipulation model we studied here, which really requires such a perfect anticipation. Quite to the contrary, the actual optimization method used to manipulate the group decision methods was rather crude. In many experiments, the iterations stopped at the iteration limit, while further improvement would have been possible. This is a very different situation from the models of strategic misrepresentation in game theory (Sobel, 2001) , which usually assume that players can truly optimize their utilities. Thus our models potentially even underestimated the possibility for manipulation.
The literature on asymmetric information typically argues (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992) that agents have better information on projects that can be carried out, their actual resource requirements or their true contributions to the objectives. All this information was public in our model. Our results indicate that just private information on preferences, which almost by definition is not public, provides a sufficient basis for successful manipulation of group decision making methods. This indicates that problems arising out of asymmetric information may be even more widespread than this stream of literature assumes.
A surprising result of our experiments is that strategic manipulation of group decision methods can actually be a good thing. Methods for multi-criteria group decision making have to work with an approximation of the group member's true preferences, if the cognitive effort of completely specifying a utility function becomes to high for group members. Consequently, there is always the risk that such methods generate inefficient compromise solutions. Our results have shown that in this case, attempts to manipulate the outcome in favor of one group member might lead to a Pareto improvement for all members. By manipulating the method, the member also implicitly provides more information on her true preferences and thus might shift the allocation of resources toward a more efficient solution.
However, the results obtained so far come from a limited number of computational experiments and thus must be interpreted with care. While a reasonable large number of parameter values was analyzed, other features of the model still limit the generalizability of results. The models used only an additive utility function. While additional experiments have shown that replacing the negative exponential function used for the partial utilities in (19) by a logarithmic function does not change the results qualitatively, more complex structures involving for example interaction effects between goals could make a difference.
Besides from using other specifications for the "true" utility function, the experiments can also be extended to take into account imperfect anticipation of outcomes by the manipulating group members. Based on the results obtained so far, it can be expected that such extensions will show that these results are quite robust to changes in the assumptions.
